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INTRODUCTION 
In order to prove liability, plaintiffs must link the failure of the Ryder 
truck's hydraulic hose to Normandeau's death. Hanson's motion for summary judgment 
argued plaintiffs' could not establish this link as a matter of law for two reasons: (1) 
Hanson owed no duty to Normandeau; and (2) Hanson's repair was not the proximate 
cause of Normandeau's death. Under plaintiffs' theory, however, any person who caused 
a truck to break down would be liable to a tow truck driver who arrived at the scene to 
tow the truck. Plaintiffs argue that no link between the repair and the forces that caused 
the injury need to be established. Under plaintiffs' argument, it is sufficient to have 
created the situation in which a tow truck is needed without any further causal link to the 
injury that occurred. 
In this case, for purposes of its motion, Hanson conceded that its repair of 
the hydraulic hose was negligent. The failure of the hydraulic hose, however, was not the 
cause of Normandeau's death. The facts relevant to what happened are undisputed. 
Normandeau was killed while he was undoing bolts that secured the driveline to a Ryder 
truck that had broken down. While Normandeau was preparing the truck for towing, the 
driveline suddenly broke free due to torque that had built up in the truck's driveline. 
Plaintiffs' expert testified that torque was created because the truck's parking brake 
engaged. 
Absent the design of the Ryder truck that caused the parking brake to 
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engage when the hydraulic system lost pressure, the failure of a hydraulic hose would not 
create torque in a truck's driveline. Torque is a known occurrence in trucks that break 
down; the failure of a hydraulic hose, however, does not create torque in a driveline. 
Rather, as plaintiffs' experts opined, it was the parking brake engaging, not the hydraulic 
hose, that caused the build up of the substantial torque in the truck's driveline. 
Plaintiffs' experts also testified that they had never seen such a substantial 
build up of torque. In fact, plaintiffs produced evidence of another similar incident where 
a tow truck driver was injured by torque in the driveline. In that case, like this one, the 
tow truck driver indicated that he was not aware that torque could build up in the 
driveline to such a substantial degree. In that other case, however, there was no evidence 
that a hydraulic hose failed. In contrast, the truck broke down for a different reason, but 
torque still built up to a substantial level. In both instances, no evidence indicated the 
failure of a hydraulic hose created torque in the driveline. Instead, the torque occurred as 
it frequently does when a truck breaks down, and in both cases, the design of the braking 
system, according to plaintiffs' theory, exacerbated the amount of torque to a level 
unforeseeable to experienced tow truck drivers. 
In summary, what happened to cause Normandeau's death was not in 
dispute - Normandeau was hit in the head by the driveline as he was undoing the bolts 
that secure the driveline. Also, the cause of the force that killed Normandeau was not in 
dispute - torque built up in the driveline causing it to whip as the bolts were removed. 
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The dispute was over who was legally responsible for the accident. Plaintiffs continue to 
assert that there are significant issues of fact; however, no genuine factual dispute exist 
on the material facts necessary to resolve the issues of duty, proximate cause, and 
contributory negligence that were presented in Hanson's motion for summary judgment. 
Plaintiffs had ample time to investigate and develop the evidence to 
establish liability on the part of Hanson. In the end, the undisputed evidence did not 
establish that Hanson owed Normandeau a legal duty of care or that Hanson was the 
proximate cause of the accident. The trial court erred in failing to grant Hanson's motion 
for summary judgment. Furthermore, the trial court erred in allowing plaintiffs to 
untimely designate an expert witness in an attempt to create issues of fact. This case 
should not have gone to the jury. In the end, the trial court's issued a series of rulings that 
caused confusing and skewed evidence to be presented to the jury who returned a legally 
unsupportable verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING HANSON 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW ON THE 
ISSUES OF DUTY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE. 
A. Hanson Owed No Duty to Normandeau. 
Assuming a negligent repair, a truck repair person owes no general duty of 
care to tow truck drivers who arrive to tow the disabled vehicle. Whether a duty is owed 
"requires a careful consideration of the consequences for the parties and society at large." 
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Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986). "[W]hether the law 
imposes a duty does not depend upon foreseeability alone. The likelihood of injury, the 
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that 
burden upon defendant, must also be taken into account." AMS Salt Indus.. Inc. v. 
Magnesium Corp. of America. 942 P.2d 315, 321 (Utah 1997). 
Here, plaintiffs attempt to impose a limitless duty on repair persons, 
regardless of whether the repair is causally linked to an injury. Hanson is not a guarantor 
that the trucks it works on are properly designed. Furthermore, Hanson cannot ensure 
subsequent repair persons properly perform their work. The law does not impose a duty 
to such remote persons absent some causal connection. The mere furnishing of the 
necessity of needing a repair person is not sufficient to impose a duty. See, e.g.. Carol 
Lorane Bryant v. Glastetter. 32 Cal.App.4th 770, 782 (1995) (drunk driver owed no duty 
to tow truck driver who was called to tow car after driver was arrested); Sanders v. Posi-
Seal Int'K 668 So. 2d 742, (La. Ct. App. 1996) (despite company's repairs to valve, 
company did not owe duty to subsequent repairman who was injured while repairing 
valve). The trial court erred in not granting Hanson's motion for summary judgment on 
issue of whether Hanson owed Normandeau a duty as a matter of law. 
R. Hanson's Repair Was Not the Proximate Cause of the Injury. 
The design of the truck's hydraulic system and/or Normandeau's negligent 
failure to relieve the driveline torque before removing the bolts to secure the driveline are 
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superceding causes which relieve Hanson of any liability for its repair. "Proximate cause 
is fthat cause which, in natural and continuous sequence [] (unbroken by an efficient 
intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the result not have occurred."1 
Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (alterations in original and citations 
omitted). Under this standard, plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating that the 
negligent repair of a hydraulic hose, without other factors outside of Hanson's control, 
created the condition causing Normandeau's death. 
Hanson's negligent repair of the Ryder truck created the condition of a truck 
broken down on the side of the road that needed to be towed. Hanson did not create 
torque, did not create the situation in which an experience tow truck driver could not 
appreciate the dangers of the torque in the driveline, and did not train or cause 
Normandeau to fail to check for or relieve built up torque in the truck's driveline. 
"Demonstrating material issues of fact with respect to defendants' negligence is not 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment if there is no evidence that establishes a direct 
causal connection between that alleged negligence and the injury." Mitchell v. Pearson 
Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240, 245 (Utah 1985). "[I]f'there could be no reasonable 
difference of opinion' on a determination of the facts 'in the usual sense' or an evaluative 
application of the legal standard to the facts, then the decision is one of law for the trial 
judge or for an appellate court." Harline. 912 P.2d at 439 (citation omitted). Also, "when 
the facts are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently established that determining causation 
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becomes 'completely speculative,' the claim fails as a matter of law." Id. 
Hansen is not asking this court to revive the rule in Hillyard v. Utah By-
Products. Co.. 263 P.2d 287 (1953), rather Hansen is asking this court to enforce a rule 
that Utah courts have consistently followed. See Mitchell, 697 P.2d at 246; Bansasine v. 
Bodell. 927 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). When the more recent negligent or 
criminal act was unforeseeable to the first negligent actor, the first actor may be relieved 
of liability. See, e.g.. Bansasine. 927 P.2d at 677. 
On each issue, plaintiffs attempt to hang their hats on issues of disputed 
facts. Plaintiffs' argument, however, has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. See 
Mitchell. 697 P.2d at 246. In Mitchell, a hotel guest was killed in his hotel room by an 
unidentified assailant. The plaintiff argued the hotel breached its duty to provide 
adequate security and this breach was the proximate cause of the guest's death. See id. at 
245-46. In Mitchell, the Court determined that the hotel owed a duty and even that the 
intervening criminal act was a foreseeable consequence of the breach of that duty to 
provide adequate security. See id. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that plaintiff failed 
to prove proximate cause because no direct evidence existed to establish a causal link. 
See id. Significantly, because the victim was unable to testify as to what happened, the 
Court noted that any number of possibilities existed as to how the death occurred - some 
of which were not the result of the hotel's breach. Thus, the Court concluded any 
proximate cause determination by a jury would be wholly speculative. See id. 
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Similarly, in Bansasine. the Utah Court of Appeals specified that a 
plaintiffs burden to establish a causal connection must include proof that a defendant 
could reasonably foresee that its negligence would cause the general nature of the injury 
that occurred. See Bansasine, 927 P.2d at 678. Under this standard, it is not the result of 
the injury, i.e. death that must be foreseeable, but rather the injury itself, i.e. a severe head 
injury from the driveline whipping into plaintiff. See id. (plaintiff must demonstrate that 
it was foreseeable that rude driving would cause a gunshot wound). Thus, plaintiffs must 
demonstrate that Hanson could reasonably foresee that its negligent repair of a hydraulic 
hose would case a severe head injury from the build up of torque in the truck's driveline. 
Like Mitchell all testimony regarding what Normandeau did or did not do 
to check for torque was entirely speculative. Given that torque in the driveline was what 
caused the driveline to whip, however, a reasonable inference existed that Normandeau 
either failed to check for or failed to relieve torque in the driveline before he attempted to 
undo the bolts securing the driveline. Moreover, because all tow truck drivers, including 
Normandeau according to the testimony of his fellow employees and plaintiffs' own 
expert, are aware of the possible presence of torque in a driveline, it is also reasonable to 
infer that prudent tow truck drivers would check for and relieve torque before undoing the 
bolts that secure the driveline. Although Hanson's repair may have precipitated the need 
for a tow truck and brought Normandeau to the scene of the accident, Hanson did not 
design the hydraulic system that created the torque, nor did it cause Normandeau to 
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negligently fail to relieve the torque. The direct cause of the injury was the design of the 
truck and/or Normandeau's own negligent actions. These circumstances cut off liability 
for Hanson. 
Normandeau failed to react as a reasonable professional would under the 
circumstances in failing to appreciate the presence of torque in the driveline. Hanson did 
not create the torque nor control Normandeau's reaction to it. Normandeau's negligent 
conduct was an extraordinary reaction to the situation and was thus unforeseeable. 
Hanson should not be held responsible for Normandeau's subsequent unforeseeable 
intervening actions. Since Normandeau's negligent actions were an unforeseeable 
consequence of Hanson's repair, Normandeau broke the chain of causation between 
Hanson's repair and the injury. Thus, the design of the truck and Normandeau's 
negligent actions were superceding causes sufficient to become the proximate cause of 
the injury and relieve Hanson of liability for its repair. 
II. HANSON?S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRESENTED 
ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW BECAUSE THE MATERIAL FACTS 
WERE NOT IN DISPUTE. 
Contrary to appellant's brief, the material facts surrounding Hanson's 
motion for summary judgment were not in dispute, and the trial court erred in its 
conclusions of law based on those material facts. Summary judgment is not precluded 
simply whenever some facts remains in dispute, but only when a material fact is 
genuinely controverted. See Heglar Ranch. Inc. v. Stillman. 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 
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1980). On appeal, this Court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in 
applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no 
disputed issues of material fact." Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996) 
(affirming grant of summary judgment on issue of proximate cause). 
Plaintiffs argue on multiple points that the facts were in dispute and 
therefore summary judgment was improper. (See PL's Brief at 19) Plaintiffs argue that 
Hanson's negligence "caused a large, unseen, and dangerous amount of torque to build up 
in the driveline." (See PL's Brief at 20). Plaintiffs mis-characterize the evidence in the 
case. As discussed in the introduction, no testimony, including plaintiffs' own experts, 
suggested the negligent repair of the hydraulic hose was the cause of torque in the truck's 
driveline. All experts, including plaintiffs' experts, recognized that torque occurs 
naturally when large trucks break down, and in this case the torque was caused by the 
parking brake engaging, as it was designed to do. 
Plaintiffs' own facts state: "As a result of the driveline parking brake 
clamping down on the driveline when the hydraulic line failed, substantial unseen torque 
was created in the driveline." (R. at 845, citing to Aff. of Rudolf Limpert at p. 4, ^ [11) 
Plaintiffs' expert notes that the parking brake engages automatically upon a drop in 
hydraulic pressure "as an emergency measure to stop the truck." (R. at 808-09) Thus, in 
plaintiffs' expert's own words, the cause of torque was not the failure of the hydraulic 
line. Instead, the cause of the torque was the parking brake engaging as an emergency 
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measure due to the design of the truck. 
Accordingly, the hydraulic hose caused the Ryder truck to break down, but 
the design of the truck caused the substantial unseen torque in the driveline. As the truck 
was being prepared for towing, Normandeau attempted to drop the truck's driveline, at 
which point the built up torque caused the driveline to whip as he was undoing the bolts 
securing the driveline. The question was whether Normandeau was (1) the victim of a 
dangerous situation that no tow truck driver would appreciate due to the unique design of 
the Ryder truck's braking system, or (2) negligent in failing to check for and relieve the 
built up torque before attempting to drop the truck's driveline. In either case, Hanson's 
negligent repair was not the proximate cause of Normandeau's death. 
Reviewing the record in this case, the material facts as to what occurred 
were not in dispute. Instead, the application of the law to the undisputed facts was 
contested. With respect to Hanson's statement of material facts in support of its motion 
for summary judgment, plaintiffs did not dispute paragraphs 1-4, 5.d., 8, 10-18, or 22-26. 
(R. at 831.) With respect to those facts that plaintiffs did dispute, the facts were either not 
material or not genuinely disputed. Specifically, plaintiffs' dispute can be broken down 
into two categories: (A) plaintiffs disputed any facts which suggested that Normandeau 
had training or knowledge regarding the design or operation of the hydraulic braking 
system in this model Ryder truck (R. at 831fl[5.a.), 833 fl|6), 838 fl|28)); and (B) plaintiffs 
disputed any facts that suggested that Normandeau was either required to check for torque 
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or did not check for torque before dropping the driveline (R. at 831 fl[5.b. & 5.c), 833 
fl|7), 834 fl[19), 835 fl[20), 837 (1f2l)).1 As explained above and as set forth more fully 
below, neither of these disputes are material to the issue of whether Hanson owed a duty 
or was the proximate cause of Normandeau's death. Furthermore, with respect to 
Normandeau's acts, plaintiffs had to rely on the affidavit of Jesse Enriquez in order to 
establish that Normandeau followed proper towing procedures. (R. at 814) Despite the 
importance of his testimony to plaintiffs1 theory of its case, Mr. Enriquez was never 
designated or disclosed as an expert witness in this case. 
^L Whether Normandeau Failed to Appreciate the Dangers of the 
Circumstances Does Not Make Hanson Liable. 
Normandeau's lack of training as to this particular kind of braking system 
and the dangers inherent in the braking system do not create a duty from Hanson to 
Normandeau, and it does not establish a causal link between Hanson's repair and the 
injuries. Hanson did not train Normandeau in preparing large trucks for towing, and 
Hanson was not Normandeau's employer. Hanson did not design the braking system on 
the Ryder truck and owed no duty to warn Normandeau of the inherent dangers of the 
hydraulic system. Finally, Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of the build up of 
torque in the truck's driveline. 
1
 The remaining disputed paragraphs concern opinions as to who was liable for the 
accident and are not material facts. (R. at 834 fl[9), 837 fl|27), 838 flfl{28, 29), 839 fl[30), 
840(H31)). 
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Torque frequently builds up in a driveline when a large truck breaks down -
torque is not the byproduct of the failure of a hydraulic hose. Torque occurs in all trucks, 
regardless of whether the truck has a hydraulic braking system like the Ryder truck. In 
this case, plaintiffs1 experts have opined, without opposition, that the build up of torque 
was substantial because the truck's parking brake engaged. Hanson did not repair the 
truck's parking brake. Hanson did not design the truck so that the parking brake would 
engage if a hydraulic line failed. In other words, Hanson did not create the circumstance 
that caused the parking brake to engage - that was how ITEC designed its truck. Finally, 
plaintiffs introduced no evidence to suggest that Hanson was aware of the design of the 
truck or the inherent dangers posed by the truck's design. (R. at 831-851) 
Plaintiffs argue that Normandeau could not have appreciated the dangerous 
situation. Indeed, plaintiffs' opposition memorandum sets forth additional facts to 
indicate that no tow truck driver would appreciate the potential build up of torque 
generated by the design of the Ryder truck's braking system. (R. at 848-851). In fact, 
plaintiffs cited to testimony that another tow truck driver had been injured by a similarly 
designed truck and due to torque that had built up in the driveline. (R. at 848) In the other 
instance of a tow truck driver being injured when the driveline whipped, the torque was 
not created by a negligent repair of a hydraulic hose. In other words, the dangerous 
situation was not a function of Hanson's negligent repair. Thus, the dangerous situation 
was created by the design of the Ryder truck and the lack of knowledge in the towing 
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industry about the peril created by the truckfs design. (R. at 848; see also R. at 814 (where 
Jesse Enriquez testified that he was not aware of the dangerous situation and that the 
Ryder truck was a "stick of dynamite")). 
Plaintiffs argument then is that neither Normandeau nor any experienced 
tow truck drivers could appreciate the dangerous condition created by the design of 
ITECs hydraulic braking system. If the situation was not foreseeable to experienced tow 
truck drivers with years of experience in dealing with torque and dropping a truck's 
driveline, it would be equally unforeseeable to Hanson that a failed hydraulic hose would 
put a tow truck driver in harm's way. Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, Hanson did not 
set a trap and then try to avoid liability. Hanson should not be held liable for a series of 
events over which it had no control. The fact that Normandeau failed to appreciate the 
dangers of the situation presented to him as a tow truck driver does not make Hanson the 
proximate cause of his death. 
R If Normandeau Was Aware of Torque and Failed to Check for it. His 
Own Negligence Was an Intervening Cause. 
If the design of the Ryder truck was not an intervening cause, the only other 
cause would be Normandeau's own negligence in either failing to check for torque, or in 
failing to relieve the built up torque if he checked for it. Plaintiffs' own belatedly 
designated towing expert stated that Normandeau was aware of torque in drivelines. (R. at 
813) Furthermore, Normandeau's fellow employees testified that he had been trained in 
how to check for torque and how to relieve torque if it was present. (R. at 620-21, 623) 
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Throughout this case, plaintiffs1 theory of the case has supported Hanson's 
position that despite any conduct by Hanson that precipitated the chain of events, 
Normandeau's own negligence was the proximate cause of his death. Plaintiffs have 
asserted and continue to assert that experienced tow-truck drivers frequently drop a 
truck's driveline prior to checking for torque. See Plaintiffs' brief at 21-22 and supporting 
citations to the Record. Neither party has disputed that torque may build up in large 
trucks when a truck breaks down, and in fact, plaintiffs' expert stated that Normandeau 
was aware of the possibility of torque in a driveline. (R. at 813). Neither party has 
disputed that the build up of torque in the driveline is potentially dangerous - hence the 
need to check for torque. If the presence of torque was not potentially dangerous, a tow 
truck driver would not need to check to see if it was present. 
Nevertheless, plaintiffs continue to assert that Normandeau did nothing 
wrong in dropping the disabled truck's driveline without first checking for torque. 
Plaintiffs argue "[a]n experienced driver would not necessarily have checked for torque 
before undoing the driveline" and Normandeau's method of removing the driveline was 
"very, very common." PL's Brief at 21-22. In fact, plaintiffs have gone so far as to 
suggest that there is no evidence that Normandeau had not checked for torque prior to 
attempting to drop the truck's drive line. (R. at 831) 
It was the torque in the driveline, however, that caused the driveline to whip 
as Normandeau attempted to undo the driveline bolts. Thus, the evidence indicates that 
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the proximate cause of Normandeau's death was one of two scenarios: Normandeau 
either failed to check for or failed to relieve the torque in the driveline. Based on the 
evidence, plaintiffs* theory is that it is not negligent for a tow truck driver to take a simple 
step of checking for a known and common danger prior to dropping a driveline. 
On the other hand, Hanson has argued a reasonably prudent tow-truck 
driver would check for torque, alleviate the torque if it existed, and then drop the truck's 
driveline to avoid possible injury. For this reason, Hanson timely and properly moved the 
trial court for summary judgment that it owed no duty to Normandeau, was not the 
proximate cause of Normandeaufs death, and was not liable because of Normandeau's 
intervening negligence. Because the facts regarding the event itself are not in dispute, the 
issues become a question of law. 
Either the situation was the result of a design that created forces which no 
tow truck driver could foresee, or the torque was a regularly occurring result of a truck 
breaking down on the side of the road. If this is a case of a regular occurrence, 
Normandeau was negligent in failing to check for and relieve torque in the truck's 
driveline before he undid the driveline bolts. Because Hanson's repair had no causal 
connection to why the injury occurred, Hanson's repair was not the proximate cause of 
Normandeau's death. Normandeau failed to take known and reasonable steps to avoid 
injury. Plaintiffs failed to produce any disputed material fact that would link Hanson's 
repair with the injury that occurred, and the trial court erred by not granting Hanson's 
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motion for summary judgment. 
III. HANSON PRESERVED ITS ARGUMENTS AND PROPERLY 
APPEALED FROM THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF ITS 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Under Utah law, this Court may review the issues raised in Hanson's motion 
for summary judgment. At trial, Hanson had no opportunity to present questions of law 
or the propriety of the trial court's decision to allow plaintiffs' untimely designation of an 
expert to oppose Hanson's motion for summary judgment. As stated by the Tenth Circuit, 
"Where a motion for summary judgment based on an issue of law is denied, appellate 
review of the motion is proper even if the case proceeds to trial and the moving party fails 
to make a subsequent Rule 50 motion." Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 56 F.3d 1226, 
1229 (10th Circuit 1995). Plaintiffs rely on Wavment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, TJ20, 144 
P.3d 1147 to argue that the denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a reviewable 
order on appeal after a trial on the merits. Reviewing Utah law, however, Hanson's 
motion for summary judgment may be reviewed on appeal, where the issues present 
questions of law and where Hanson had no ability to present the issues at trial. 
When a party had an opportunity to present the same issues raised in a 
partial summary judgment motion at trial, the interlocutory denial of the partial summary 
judgment motion is not reviewable on appeal. See Wavment, at ffl[19-20. The Wavment 
decision, however, cites to no other Utah law on this point, nor does it address what 
issues were raised in the motion for partial summary judgment motion. Importantly, the 
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Supreme Court held that issues that could not be addressed at trial may be appealed and 
reviewed by an appellate court. See id. at f 20. Utah law provides that Monce trial counsel 
has raised an issue before the trial court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the 
issue is preserved for appeal." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 
48,TJ14,48P.3d968. 
In this matter, Hanson's motion requested the trial court to rule as a matter 
of law on the following issues: (1) whether Hanson owed Normandeau a duty of care, (2) 
whether its repair was the proximate cause of Normandeau's death, and (3) whether 
Normandeau's own negligence was an intervening cause which cut off Hanson's liability. 
Moreover, on appeal, Hanson argued that not only did the trial court err in its legal 
conclusions on the above three issues, but it also committed a fourth error in allowing 
plaintiffs to present an untimely designated expert affidavit to create issues of fact in 
order to defeat Hanson's motion for summary judgment. Utah law unequivocally allows 
review of an improper grounds for opposing a motion for summary judgment. See Brown 
v. Jorgensen. 2006 UT App 168, Tffl9-22, 136 P.3d 1252 (reviewing denial of partial 
summary judgment motion after trial on merits where part of the argument was to strike 
improper affidavit used to oppose motion). As set forth below, Hanson was foreclosed 
from presenting these legal issues at trial, and the trial court erred by allowing and 
considering the affidavit of previously undisclosed expert witness in opposition to 
Hanson's motion. 
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A. The Issue of Duty Is Always a Question of Law for the Court. 
A pretrial ruling on the issue of whether a duty of care is owed is always 
reviewable on appeal. With respect to the issue of whether a duty of care is owed, 
"whether a duty of care is owed is 'entirely a question of law to be determined by the 
court.'" Rose v. Provo City, 2003 UT App 77, ^8, 67 P.3d 1017 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). In determining whether a duty exists, the courts weigh a variety of 
factors: ffA court's conclusion that duty does or does not exist is ?an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is [or is 
not] entitled to protection.'" Webb v. University of Utah. 2005 UT 80, ^ [9, 125 P.3d 906. 
The resolution of this legal conclusion is for the trial court alone to make, and its decision 
requires it to address a number of competing issues and considerations which are not 
presented to the jury during a trial on the merits. See, e.g.. Webb. 2005 UT 80 at \1 
(discussing the intersection of tort law, governmental immunity doctrine, and special 
relationship doctrine as determinative of whether duty exists); AMS Salt Ind., Inc. v. 
Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997) (addressing reliance, 
foreseeability, general common law, Utah law, and policy considerations in determining 
whether duty existed as a matter of law). Because the trial court denied Hanson's motion 
for summary judgment, the trial court necessarily concluded that Hanson owed 
Normandeau a duty of care. Hanson was foreclosed from presenting whether a legal duty 
existed at trial, and thus, the arguments were properly preserved and are properly before 
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this Court on appeal. See Wayment 2006 UT 56 at |20. 
Bj, Proximate Cause/Contributory Negligence. 
As presented by Hanson in its motion for summary judgment, the question 
of proximate cause presented a question of law that is reviewable on appeal. Hanson 
argued that as a matter of law, it was not the proximate cause of Normandeaufs death. 
Although causation is typically a jury issue, "when the plaintiff cannot fshow that a jury 
could conclude, without speculation,1 that the injury would not have occurred but for the 
defendant's breach," then it presents a question of law. Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake 
Bus. Dist, 2005 UT App 489, ^ [14, 126 P.3d 781. Even on the question of causation, 
where a motion for summary judgment presents the question as a legal issue rather than 
for sufficiency of the evidence, the determination of the question is "manifestly a 
question of law that the court must decide." See Wilson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 56 F.3d 
1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing on appeal and after trial on the merits, defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the issue of causation). 
In this case, Hanson's motion for summary judgement requested that the 
trial court rule, as a matter of law, that Hanson's negligence was not the cause of 
Normandeau's death. In fact, for purposes of the motion, Hanson conceded that its repair 
was negligent, but that Hanson's negligence was not the cause of Normandeau's death. 
Hanson argued alternatively that either ITEC's negligent design and/or Normandeau's 
own negligence were the proximate cause of Normandeau's death. 
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With respect to causation, Hanson set forth a detailed recitation of plaintiffs* 
theory of the case in its opening brief. Plaintiffs have not disputed or argued that Hanson 
has somehow mischaracterized plaintiffs' theory of the case. Similarly, plaintiffs did not 
offer genuine disputes to Hanson's statement of material facts in support of its motion for 
summary judgment. 
In order to create an issue on the application of law to these facts, plaintiffs' 
opposition memorandum cited to the affidavit of Jesse Enriquez, a previously undisclosed 
towing expert. Plaintiffs' relied on Enriquez's affidavit to argue that Hanson was the 
proximate cause and that Normandeau's acts were entirely proper and non-negligent. 
Whether or not Enriquez's testimony should have been considered in opposition to 
Hanson's motion could not have been presented at trial and is properly reviewed by this 
Court after a trial on the merits. See Wayment 2006 UT 56 at f20; Brown, 2006 UT App 
168 at TflJ 19-22. These are legal questions which the trial court was required to decide. 
Moreover, the trial court's decision to allow Enriquez's belated affidavit is properly 
reviewed by this Court. The fact that some of the issues went to the jury does not cut off 
this Court's ability to review the trial court's legal determinations on Hanson's motion for 
summary judgment and its decision to allow Enriquez's previously undisclosed testimony. 
IV. OTHER ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
Hanson submits the other issues it raised in its opening brief based on the 
arguments it made in its opening brief. After considering plaintiffs' opposition, Hanson 
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has no additional arguments to add. Hanson does not want its silence on the additional 
issues construed as a waiver or withdrawal of those issues on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, Hanson requests this Court to 
reverse the trial court's denial of its motion for summary judgment and remand for entry 
of an order dismissing plaintiffs' claims against Hanson. In conjunction with reversing 
the trial courtfs denial of Hanson's motion for summary judgment, Hanson requests this 
Court to enforce the proposition that scheduling orders mean something and the deadlines 
contained therein are enforceable. In the alternative, Hanson requests this Court to 
remand for a new trial with instructions to correct the trial court's errors and abuses of its 
discretion. 
DATED this 5 day of May, 2007. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
.INDA A. MORGAN 
[CHARY E. PETERSON 
Attorneys for Defendant Hanson Equipment, 
Inc. 
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